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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Jersey decision with its proper expert testimony and sufficient evidence
properly submitted on the tests of the device is an indication that the
courts are ready to accept it."
There as yet has been no appeal taken to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court on the use of a radar speedmeter in the case of a speeding vio-
lation on Wisconsin highways. One case at the trial court level has been
decided in which the defendant was convicted as charged through use
of the device in question? In that case the State procured an expert
witness who testified regarding the principle and accuracy of the radar
device, and officers were permitted to testify regarding their testing of
the device over the hearsay objection of the defendant. The court held
that it was satisfied by the expert testimony that the radar speedmeter
was a proper device to record speed, and that since both officers were
present to testify to the test of the speedmeter and were subject to
cross examination, their testimony was not hearsay. The officers in this
case submitted in evidence the written records of the speeding violation
made at the scene of the violation. At the present time the burden rests
with the State, at each trial, to establish the acceptability of the radar
speedmeter as a proper instrument to measure speed and its accuracy as
of the time of the arrest.'0 This will continue to involve "lengthy
litigation and appeals.""
Perhaps the legislature will come to the assistance of the prosecution
in establishing the scientific worth of this device. As to the objection
on the ground of hearsay evidence used to prove the State's case, it
would appear that the New Jersey decision has pointed out the methods
of its avoidance; this objection should present little difficulty where
there is offered in evidence testimony by each officer as to his inde-
pendant observations while testing the device and at the time of arrest,
along with written records of the accuracy of the speedmeter at the
time of test and arrest.
THOMAS A. SAVIGNAC
Federal Criminal Procedure-"Plain Error" in Instructions-
Defendants were convicted of conspiring to defraud the United States
by obstructing the Bureau of Internal Revenue in its assessment and
collection of taxes. Defendant Benater assigned as error the refusal of
the district court to give an instruction requested by defendants to the
effect that the alleged conspiracy, so far as defendant Benater was con-
s See Rooney, Admissibility of Radar Speedmeter Readings, 28 TUL. L.REv. 398-
400 (1954).
9 State v. Leuch, District Court of Milwaukee County, No. 50971, February 3,
1954, Judge Gregorski, presiding. However, this decision was reversed on the
facts by a jury on appeal to the Circuit Court of Milwaukee County, No. 1763.
10 Supra, note 5.
11 Supra, note 4.
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cerned, and his connection therewith, could not be established by any
other alleged co-conspirator's acts and declarations. Held: that the
Court of Appeals could not consider the error assigned because of the
failure of defendant to state to the trial judge the ground of his ob-
jection, as required by Rule 30, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
18 U.S.C.A.' Denman, C. J., dissenting, contended that the refusal of
the requested instruction was plain error affecting substantial rights, as
contemplated by Rule 52(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18
U.S.C.A.,2 and that the Court of Appeals could, therefore, consider the
error. Benater v. United States, 209 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1954).
Appellate Courts will not ordinarily recognize or determine errors
not previously brought to the attention of the trial court; this rule is de-
signed to effectuate the orderly administration of justice and is founded
upon considerations of fairness to the court, to the parties and to the
public interest in bringing litigation to an end after fair opportunity has
been afforded to present all issues of law and fact.3 This doctrine is in-
corporated into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, with respect
to instructions, by Rule 30, which is a restatement of the decisional
law.4 But even under the decisional rule, where the error was such as to
amount to a denial of fundamental rights, the court could notice it on its
own motion.5 This right to notice errors not objected to at the trial was
preserved to the Federal appellate courts by Rule 52(b), which pro-
vides that plain error affecting substantial rights may be noticed though
not called to the attention of the court. Rules 30 and 52(b) are in pari
materia and should be construed together to continue the decisional
rule.5 By judicial interpretation, Rule 52(b) has been read to mean "not
brought to the attention of the trial court,' 17 but it has been used in
many cases to justify reversals for errors neither called to the attention
of the trial court nor even raised in the briefs of counsel on appeal."
""Rule 30. Instructions.
At the close of the cvidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the
court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court in-
struct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests. At the same time copies
of such requests shall be furnished to adverse parties. The court shall inform
counsel of its proposed action upon the requests prior to their arguments to
the jury, but the court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are com-
pleted. No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its ver-
dict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his
objection. Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hear-
ing of the jury." (Emphasis added.)
2 "Rule 52(b). Plain Error.
Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although
they are not brought to the attention of the court."
3 United States v. Jones, 204 F2d 745 (7th Cir. 1953).
4 Ryles v. United States, 172 F.2d 72 (10th Cir. 1948).
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.; Apodaca v. United States, 188 F.2d 932 (10th Cir. 1951).
7 United States v. Jones, supra note 3; United States v. Raub, 177 F.2d 312
(7th Cir. 1949).
8 United States v. Kemble, 197 F.2d 316 (3rd Cir. 1952); Simmons v. United
1954]
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The application of Rule 52(b) rests, in large measure, upon the ex-
ercise of the sound judicial discretion of the court.9 But in order for
the court, under this rule, to notice the errors assigned, it is said that
such errors must be substantial and capable of resulting in a miscar-
riage of justice ;10 some courts have gone so far as to say that when the
defendant has failed to object, only the strongest kind of showing that
justice has miscarried will avail him on appeal." Still others have re-
quired that there be readily apparent on the face of the record such a
condition of unfairness and injustice as would appeal to the discretion
of the court and prompt it to correct an obvious error in the administra-
tion of justice.1 2 On the other hand, it has always been the custom of
one court, in cases of serious criminal offenses, to check the record care-
fully for error prejudicial to the defendant which he did not urge. 3
When the error is thus tardily asserted, however, a judgment is to be
exercised which does not turn in each instance upon treatment of the
alleged error in isolation from other circumstances."
Stringent though this requirement might be, defendants have not
infrequently been able to have their convictions reversed because of er-
rors committed upon trial, to which they failed to object. In the field of
instructions, the cases generally fall into three classes: 1) those in which
there is a failure to give a necessary instruction; 2) those in which an
erroneous or misleading instruction has been given; and 3) those in
which an instruction has been given which distorts the evidence to the
prejudice of the defendant, or which assumes a fact which was not in
evidence.
Failure of a trial court in a criminal case to instruct on all essential
questions of law involved in the case, whether requested or not, clearly
affects "substantial rights" within the meaning of Rule 52(b) ;15 there-
fore, if the error is sufficiently "plain," as it nearly always is where the
question of law is essential to the case, the appellate court may review
and reverse even though no request was made nor objection taken to
the omission at the trial. In one case,' 6 defendant had been convicted of
receiving stolen property. The applicable statute provided for varying
States, 206 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612(D.C. Cir. 1951) ; McGuinn v. United States, 191 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
9 United States v. Jones, supra note 3; United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69
(7th Cir. 1954).
10 United States v. Raub, supra note 7.
11 Wagner v. United States, 171 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1948).
12 United States v. Jonikas, 187 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1951); United States v.
Powell, 155 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1946).
is Tatum v. United States, supra note 8.
14 Crawford v. United States, 198 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ; cf. United States
v. Monroe, 164 F2d 471 (2d Cir. 1947); Felton v. United States, 170 F2d 153
(D.C. Cir. 1948).
25Tatum v. United States, supra note 8; Schino v. United States, 209 F.2d 67
(9th Cir. 1954).
16 McQuaid v. United States, 193 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
[Vol. 38
RECENT DECISIONS
prison terms depending upon the value if the property involved. The
trial court, however, failed to instruct the jury to find the value of the
property. The appellate court held that this omission was error and
could be noticed even though defendant had made no request for the in-
struction nor objection to its omission . The conviction was nevertheless
affirmed ,the court pointing out that the sentence imposed by the trial
court was not excessive even though the value of the property be con-
sidered as falling within the lowest class of offenses.
The rule is frequently stated that an instruction must discuss and
define the offenses charged and must break them down into their con-
stituent elements.1 7 Failure to so instruct will constitute a plain error
affecting substantial rights; and so, in Morris v. United States,8 where
the trial court in its instructions did not define the offense charged and
gave the jury no opportunity to apply the law to the facts, merely telling
them that if they found that certain facts were true, then they must re-
turn a verdict of guilty, it was held that such omission was plain error.
The conviction was, therefore, reversed, even though no objection had
been made at the trial. Likewise, a conviction for wilful evasion of
taxes was reversed, even though no objection was made, when the in-
structions assumed that the only question for the jury was that of in-
tent, which instructions amounted, in effect, to a directed verdict on the
issues of falsity and fraudulence.19
Where some proof of insanity was adduced upon trial, it was held in
one case that it was reversible error for the trial court to fail to instruct
with respect to that defense, even though no request had been made.2 0
On the other hand, it has been held that failure of the trial court to in-
struct on the presumption of innocence was not reversible error in the
absence of a request for such instruction.2 1
If the trial court erroneously instructs the jury on the law, the ap-
pellate court may notice the error if it is plain and affects substantial
rights. There appear to be no real standards on which to rely for the
application of this rule, the decision resting in the discretion of the ap-
pellate court. However, as stated above,22 it would seem that the errone-
ous instruction must have been at least capable of causing a miscarriage
of justice. An instruction stating that the jury could consider the failure
of the defendant to take the stand in his defense,2 and an instruction
that improperly stated the law with respect to entrapment2 ' have been
17 McGuinn v. United States, supra note 8; Williams v. United States, 131 F2d
21 (D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Morris v. United States, 156 F2d 525 (9th Cir. 1946).
18 Supra note 17.
'19 United States v. Raub, supra note 7.20 Tatum v. United States, supra note 8.
21 Spevak v. United States, 158 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1946).
22 Supra note 10.
23 United States v. Ward, 168 F.2d 226 (3rd Cir. 1948).
24 United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1952).
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held to be reversible error though no objection was made. In Jones v.
United States,25 a prosecution for premeditated murder, the trial court
instructed the jury that there need be no appreciable length of time be-
tween the formation of the intent to kill and the killing itself, that "it
may be as instantaneous as successive thought." The appellate court
held that this instruction was plainly erroneous, and reversed the con-
viction, even though no objection had been made.
The last class of cases includes those in which the judge, in his in-
structions, has distorted the evidence or assumed a fact which was not
in evidence. This sort of error is clearly prejudicial when the distortion
or assumption is at all detrimental to the defendant's case, and the cases
generally hold that such error may be noticed on appeal though no ob-
jection is made. In Austin v. United States,28 the trial court instructed
that "defendants admitted that Austin shot and killed Gonzalez." Point-
ing out that neither defendant had admitted that the dead man was
Gonzales, the appellate court reversed the conviction, stating that the
error was plain and affected substantial rights and that, therefore, the
error could be noticed though no objection had been made. Likewise, in
Robertson v. United States,27 a prosecution for forgery, the defendant
failed to object to an instruction which stated that the jury might con-
sider testimony of the storekeeper who cashed the check that he saw the
defendants dividing the money. The actual testimony of the store-
keeper had been merely that he saw one of the defendants pass money
to the other and "thought they were arguing over the divvy of the
money." The appellate court noticed the error and reversed. In United
States v. Balodinias,28 defendant was convicted of attempting to defeat
income taxes. Upon the trial, defendant's employes testified that they
had set aside a part of each day's receipts before they made entries in
defendant's books of account; but there was no evidence that these em-
ployes were aware of the fact that such activity might be considered an
attempt to defeat taxes. The trial judge instructed that these employes
had openly admitted that they were law violators and that they had
taken part in the commission of a crime. The defendant made no ob-
jection to this instruction; the appellate court reversed, nevertheless,
because of the fact that the instruction of the trial judge had misstated
the evidence.
On the one hand, it can be said that every defendant has a right to a
fair trial free from prejudicial error, and that this right should not be
made to depend so heavily upon the aptness of his counsel in perceiving
every error as it occurs. But, on the other hand, if the rule were differ-
25 175 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1949).
26208 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1953).
27 171 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
28177 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1949).
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ent from what it is and required merely that the error be prejudicial in-
stead of being capable of in a miscarriage of justice, objections at trials
would be few and reversals of convictions many for errors which could
have been prevented or corrected immediately at the trial. This being
true, Rule 52(b) and the interpretations which have been given to it are
sound in law and logic.
ROBERT H. GORSKE
BOOK REVIEW
LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHATTEL SEcu.ED FARm CREIT, by Glenn R.
Coates, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1954. Pp. xi, 105.
$2.75.
The author of the volume under review has compiled an interesting
analysis of how secured loans are made to Wisconsin farmers. Mr.
Coates has interviewed many financial institutions and other lending
agencies to determine the types of security devices actually in use. This
survey revealed a number which have been accepted by the trade for
many years although not all of them have been subjected to a court test.
The instruments discussed include chattel mortgages, conditional sales
contracts, milk check assignments, powers of attorney, and bank drafts
incorporating a bill of sale. Less popular devices appear to be reser-
vation of title to crops by landlord as security for rent payments, in-
surance policy assignments, and pledges.
The impact of Wisconsin law on loan procedures is particularly evi-
dent with respect to crop mortgages. Because of court decisions holding
that a mortgage on property to be acquired is void, special devices have
been developed where crops not yet in existence are intended as se-
curity. These include a promise by the farmer, with or without a power
of attorney, to execute a mortgage when the crops later come into ex-
istence. In the potato growing regions the farmer is often made trustee
of the crop until the mortgage is executed. The author doubts the
validity of these devices if subjected to litigation, stating: "It is not
likely that the court will permit form to triumph over substance."
(p. 16)
Subsequent chapters deal with matters arising after the loan has
been made, including the rights of third parties in the assets securing
the loan and procedures for enforcement in the event of default. The
survey found no instances where the debtor insisted on a statutory fore-
closure. It appears that debtors, at least under the present economic
conditions, are willing to cooperate with the lender in getting out of
debt as painlessly as possible. One popular method of accomplishing
1954]
